Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board DNFSB _69001bf3-cf53-448f-b3e0-1564b1b92289 7d49b2a2-1b00-4d81-9537-205ee1180c85 The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board), an independent executive branch agency, is charged with providing technical safety oversight of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) defense nuclear facilities and activities in order to protect the health and safety of the public and workers. _a53f030d-675b-41a9-b588-ee71bfb31f0a Safety Oversight Assist DOE in improving safety at existing and proposed defense nuclear facilities by identifying health and safety issues affecting the public and the workers, recommending actions to address these issues, and ensuring that corrective actions are completed. _246858b7-360a-424f-937b-c88d6f8abb03 Interdependency of These Four Performance Goals: The interdependence of these four strategic areas of concentration must be understood to appreciate the efficiency of the Board’s operating plan and corresponding organizational alignment. “Lessons learned” from the Board’s health and safety oversight activities crosscut into each of these four areas. Health and safety hazards identified in Nuclear Material Processing and Stabilization (Area 2) must be transferred to the Nuclear Weapon Operations (Area 1) to avoid or mitigate new remediation issues before they happen. Likewise, the lessons learned from Nuclear Facilities Design and Infrastructure (Area 3) must be shared with managers responsible for preparing and enforcing health and safety-related guidance, requirements, and regulations in Nuclear Safety Programs and Analysis (Area 4). For example, in order to oversee safety at the Y-12 National Security Complex, the Board must assess the safety of hazardous activities that support the nuclear weapons stockpile (Area 1). To accomplish its general goal, the Board must also assess processing and stabilization of nuclear materials to support facility deactivation, such as Building 9206 (Area 2), construction of new defense nuclear facilities such as the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (Area 3), and implementation of important safety programs such as criticality safety (Area 4). Another example of the interdependence of the four strategic areas of concentration is the safety oversight of the Savannah River Site. At this site, the Board must evaluate not only the safety of nuclear material processing and stabilization activities such as disposing of high level waste (Area 2), but also the safety of nuclear weapon support activities involving tritium operations (Area 1), the construction of new defense nuclear facilities such as the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (Area 3), and nuclear safety programs such as high level waste tank integrity inspections (Area 4). As discussed in Strategic Area 3 above, DOE is designing and constructing many new defense nuclear facilities that will be used to support the nuclear weapon operations and/or nuclear material processing and stabilization. To ensure that DOE protects the health and safety of the public and the workers, the Board must pay close attention to the design, construction, start-up and operation of these facilities, as well as major modifications to existing facilities, including the selection of governing safety standards and requirements. Equally important, the Board evaluates the directives, standards, and programs governing DOE’s safe performance of its hazardous defense nuclear activities. The Board’s first three strategic areas of concentration heavily rely upon the implementation of specific DOE rules and directives. The Board’s integrated, comprehensive oversight of the safety of DOE’s defense nuclear facilities requires that the Board carefully evaluate these safety programs. The synergy gained from constant information-sharing among the Board’s matrixed staff which supports all four strategic areas of concentration is key to achieving the Board’s general goal. NUCLEAR WEAPON OPERATIONS DOE operations that directly support the nuclear stockpile and defense nuclear research are conducted in a manner that ensures adequate protection of the health and safety of the workers and the public. _2a41529b-0928-43a9-bc1b-00f001545b21 Area 1 Stockpile management is the term used to describe the industrial aspects of maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and complex. Board oversight activities for this strategic area focus on assuring that current and planned operations at the Pantex Plant in Texas, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee, and tritium operations at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina are accomplished safely according to approved standards. Also included in this strategic area is the DOE stockpile stewardship program, which refers to activities carried out by DOE to ensure confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons in the stockpile, in the absence of underground nuclear weapons testing. The Board’s oversight of the stockpile stewardship program is centered on assuring the safety of the research, development, manufacturing, and testing activities conducted at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, the Nevada Test Site, and Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico and California. Outcome: DOE will have acknowledged, acted upon, and/or resolved the health and safety issues raised by the Board, and the facilities are operated to approved safety standards, rules, orders, and directives. Follow-up technical evaluations of DOE’s nuclear stockpile activities will verify necessary improvements in safety. 93a57420-fa86-4997-8c37-ec71a4a589ac f7aae8c2-7ee2-4746-893e-41c91d04184f NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROCESSING AND STABILIZATION The processing, stabilization, and disposition of DOE defense nuclear materials and facilities are performed in a manner that ensures adequate protection of the health and safety of the workers and the public. _e875bb62-4c68-4bd0-843b-ca5d572d43ad Area 2 With the shutdown of major weapon production activities at defense nuclear facilities in the early 1990s, substantial quantities of plutonium, uranium, transuranic isotopes, and irradiated fuel have remained in storage for extended periods under potentially unsafe and deteriorating conditions. The Board’s focus in this strategic area is to aid DOE in identifying these excess materials and in reviewing DOE’s plans/programs to stabilize the materials and place them in a safe configuration for storage pending future programmatic use or disposition. Board oversight in this area will include the stabilization of spent nuclear fuel at the Hanford Site in Washington and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, the nuclear waste programs being conducted at the Savannah River and Hanford sites as well as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico and the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. The Board will also provide health and safety oversight of DOE programs to safely deactivate and decommission facilities at the Hanford and Savannah River Sites, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee, the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site in Colorado, and the Fernald and Mound Sites in Ohio, and the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories in New Mexico and California. Outcome: DOE will have acknowledged, acted upon, and/or resolved the health and safety issues raised by the Board. Follow-up technical evaluations of DOE’s nuclear materials management and facility disposition activities will verify necessary improvements in safety, as DOE meets its commitments to the Board to stabilize and dispose of hazardous nuclear materials. 04ea22a9-83a5-4c9f-837e-61237a8983d3 9a6934aa-248d-4211-8ab4-60c4ab72110b NUCLEAR FACILITIES DESIGN AND INFRASTRUCTURE New DOE defense nuclear facilities, and major modifications to existing facilities, are designed and constructed in a manner that ensures adequate protection of the health and safety of the workers and the public. _b4274a60-41dc-43f7-8c73-1b1b6dcc8137 Area 3 To ensure that safety is addressed early in the process, the Board reviews the design and construction of new DOE defense nuclear facilities. These facilities must be designed and constructed in a manner that will support safe and efficient operations for 20 to 50 years. This requires a robust design process that will ensure appropriate safety controls are identified and properly implemented early in the process. The Board’s expectation is that the design and construction phases of defense nuclear facilities will be accomplished under approved nuclear codes and standards, and demonstrate clear and deliberate implementation of Integrated Safety Management (ISM) principles and core functions. The Board’s reviews of the design and construction of major facilities and projects in this strategic area are resource intensive and time consuming, but they result in significant safety improvements. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of new DOE projects, with 20 to 30 projects in the design and construction phase. Examples of these new projects include the Tritium Extraction Facility, currently under construction at the Savannah River Site; the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant, which is in the design and construction phase; the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, which is in the design phase at the Y-12 Site; and the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility, which is in the design stage at the Savannah River Site. Outcome: DOE will have acknowledged, acted upon, and/or resolved the health and safety issues raised by the Board. Follow-up technical evaluations will verify necessary safety improvements in the design and construction of DOE’s new nuclear facilities and major modifications to existing facilities. New nuclear facility designs will meet acceptable safety standards. 3db0e797-5e97-4f4b-9c69-8c1f5db116a8 4f779bb7-1ac6-4456-a73c-ee92379a99db NUCLEAR SAFETY PROGRAMS AND ANALYSIS DOE regulations, requirements, and guidance are developed, implemented, and maintained; and safety programs at defense nuclear facilities are established and implemented; as necessary to protect adequately the health and safety of the workers and the public. _67cefd1e-a1de-43d0-90bd-655bdc3a0ba9 Area 4 The Board’s oversight effort in this area focuses on issues where a complex-wide perspective on health and safety issues across the DOE complex is required to identify and correct generic health and safety problems. Under the aegis of Integrated Safety Management (ISM),1 significant resources are applied to areas such as the technical competence of DOE’s Federal workforce, the efficiency of DOE’s line management and safety oversight, and the development and implementation of ISM systems with particular focus on safety analyses and controls. Key supporting functional areas are also reviewed, such as quality assurance, nuclear criticality safety, and training and qualifications. The Board’s reviews in this strategic area often build on data collected at the field level in the first three areas, integrating and analyzing the results to feed back key information that can be used to direct safety program improvement across multiple management lines. For example, at the Board’s urging, DOE issued a quality assurance improvement plan to strengthen the implementation of existing quality requirements for safety-related components and systems. Similarly, the Board continues its efforts to ensure that DOE maintains a vigorous nuclear criticality safety infrastructure to support nuclear operations. The Board has been instrumental in driving recent DOE efforts to verify that vital safety systems have been identified throughout the defense nuclear complex and that their condition is understood and controlled. Outcome: DOE will have acknowledged, acted upon, and/or resolved the health and safety issues raised by the Board. In addition, follow-up technical evaluations of DOE’s safety programs at defense nuclear facilities will verify necessary improvements in safety, and effective implementation of ISM principles. 32d26f4a-4ca5-4ae9-aeaa-fb9b8855bbba e58f4e86-3742-41c6-8b1a-486200204df3 2003-11-17 2009-09-30 2010-02-08 http://www.dnfsb.gov/pub_docs/dnfsb/rcsp_2003.pdf Arthur Colman (www.drybridge.com) colman@drybridge.com Submit error.