National Defense Strategy, Department of Defense National Defense Strategy, Department of Defense NDS _e643ed0d-9d3c-4174-9df2-1fbe77efa6ce d2f1748a-b05f-4ed1-92fb-73b40d0534c3 The National Defense Strategy (NDS) serves as the Department’s capstone document in [the] long-term effort [to provide enduring security for the American people]. It flows from the National Security Strategy (NSS) and informs the National Military Strategy (NMS). It also provides a framework for other DoD strategic guidance, specifically on campaign and contingency planning, force development, and intelligence. It addresses how the U.S. Armed Forces will fight and win America’s wars and how we seek to work with and through partner nations to shape opportunities in the international environment to enhance security and avert conflict. _83e061a6-47ce-4205-85ae-e4f3fd50a6fa Homeland Defense Defend the Homeland _16b7a90a-4ba3-40f3-a091-ab4e150fec59 1 The core responsibility of the Department of Defense is to defend the United States from attack upon its territory at home and to secure its interests abroad. The U.S. Armed Forces protect the physical integrity of the country through an active layered defense. They also deter attacks upon it, directly and indirectly, through deployments at sea, in the air, on land, and in space. However, as the spreading web of globalization presents new opportunities and challenges, the importance of planning to protect the homeland against previously unexpected threats increases. Meeting these challenges also creates a tension between the need for security and the requirements of openness in commerce and civil liberties. On the one hand, the flow of goods, services, people, technology and information grows every year, andwith it the openness of American society. On the other hand, terrorists and otherswishing us harm seek to exploit that openness.As noted in the 2006 QDR, state actors no longer have a monopoly over thecatastrophic use of violence. Small groups or individuals can harness chemical,biological, or even crude radiological or nuclear devices to cause extensivedamage and harm. Similarly, they can attack vulnerable points in cyberspace and disrupt commerce and daily life in the United States, causing economic damage,compromising sensitive information and materials, and interrupting critical services such as power and information networks. National security and domestic resources may be at risk, and the Department must help respond to protect lives and national assets. The Department will continue to be both bulwark and active protector in these areas. Yet, in the long run the Department of Defense is neither the best source of resources and capabilities nor the appropriate authority to shoulder these tasks. The comparative advantage, and applicable authorities, for action reside elsewhere in the U.S. Government, at other levels of government, in the private sector, and with partner nations. DoD should expect and plan to play akey supporting role in an interagency effort to combat these threats, and to helpdevelop new capacities and capabilities, while protecting its own vulnerabilities. While defending the homeland in depth, the Department must also maintain the capacity to support civil authorities in times of national emergency such as in the wake of catastrophic natural and man-made disasters. The Department will continue to maintain consequence management capabilities and plan for their use to support government agencies. Effective execution of such assistance, especially amid simultaneous, multi-jurisdictional disasters, requires ever-closer working relationships with other departments and agencies, and at all levels of government. To help develop and cultivate these working relationships, the Department willcontinue to support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is responsible for coordinating the Federal response to disasters. DoD must also reach out to non-governmental agencies and private sector entities that play a role in disaster response and recovery. 90f9fe97-8382-44cd-addc-2bcf1adf6c8c 620d8ffd-d492-4e2d-900e-945f2ecaa033 87e045f8-69f4-470d-9f8e-2b3e7d239904 Long War Win the Long War _547319ec-c8f3-4cb0-bc9e-d47edab3d486 2 For the foreseeable future, winning the Long War against violent extremist movements will be the central objective of the U.S. We must defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society and foster an environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all those who support them. We face an extended series of campaigns to defeat violent extremist groups, presently led by al-Qaeda and its associates. In concert with others, we seek to reduce support for violent extremism and encourage moderate voices, offering apositive alternative to the extremists’ vision for the future. Victory requires us to apply all elements of national power in partnership with old allies and newpartners. Iraq and Afghanistan remain the central fronts in the struggle, but we cannot lose sight of the implications of fighting a long-term, episodic, multi-front,and multi-dimensional conflict more complex and diverse than the Cold War confrontation with communism. Success in Iraq and Afghanistan is crucial to winning this conflict, but it alone will not bring victory. We face a clash of arms, awar of ideas, and an assistance effort that will require patience and innovation. In concert with our partners, we must maintain a long-term commitment to undermining and reducing the sources of support for extremist groups, and to countering the ideological totalitarian messages they build upon. We face a global struggle. Like communism and fascism before it, extremistideology has transnational pretensions, and like its secular antecedents, it draws adherents from around the world. The vision it offers is in opposition to globalization and the expansion of freedom it brings. Paradoxically, violent extremist movements use the very instruments of globalization – the unfettered flow of information and ideas, goods and services, capital, people, and technology– that they claim to reject to further their goals. Although driven by this transnational ideology, our adversaries themselves are, in fact, a collection of regional and local extremist groups. Regional and local grievances help fuel the conflict, and it thrives in ungoverned, under-governed, and mis-governed areas.This conflict is a prolonged irregular campaign, a violent struggle for legitimacy and influence over the population. The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies. For these reasons, arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves. Working with and through local actors whenever possible to confront common security challenges is the best and most sustainable approach to combat violent extremism. Often our partners are better positioned to handle a given problem because they understand the local geography, social structures, and culture better than we do or ever could. In collaboration with interagency and international partners we will assist vulnerable states and local populations as they seek to ameliorate the conditions that foster extremism and dismantle the structures thatsupport and allow extremist groups to grow. We will adopt approaches tailored to local conditions that will vary considerably across regions. We will help foster security and aid local authorities in building effective systems of representational government. By improving conditions, undermining the sources of support, andassisting in addressing root causes of turmoil, we will help states stabilize threatened areas. Countering the totalitarian ideological message of terrorist groups to help further undermine their potency will also require sensitive, sophisticated and integrated interagency and international efforts. The Department will support and facilitate these efforts. The struggle against violent extremists will not end with a single battle orcampaign. Rather, we will defeat them through the patient accumulation of quiet successes and the orchestration of all elements of national and international power. We will succeed by eliminating the ability of extremists to strike globally and catastrophically while also building the capacity and resolve of local governments to defeat them regionally. Victory will include discrediting extremist ideology, creating fissures between and among extremist groups and reducing them to the level of nuisance groups that can be tracked and handled by law enforcement capabilities. bdc04867-9462-4dc2-bf59-54cadb800473 64526d98-8baa-4fe4-b300-8dbd7fad0d41 aff1843a-7216-4985-8a05-c24af507b6c8 Security Promote Security _11d50c09-b80c-4a28-9e7b-ba01fce87d5e 3 The best way to achieve security is to prevent war when possible and to encourage peaceful change within the international system. Our strategy emphasizes building the capacities of a broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long-term security. We must also seek to strengthen the resiliency of the international system to deal with conflict when it occurs. We must be prepared to deal with sudden disruptions, to help prevent them from escalating or endangering international security, and to find ways to bring them swiftly to a conclusion. Local and regional conflicts in particular remain a serious and immediate problem. They often spread and may exacerbate transnational problems such as trafficking in persons, drug-running, terrorism, and the illicit arms trade. Rogue states and extremist groups often seek to exploit the instability caused by regional conflict, and state collapse or the emergence of ungoverned areas may create safe havens for these groups. The prospect that instability and collapse in a strategic statecould provide extremists access to weapons of mass destruction or result in control of strategic resources is a particular concern. To preclude such calamities, we will help build the internal capacities of countries at risk. We will work with and through like-minded states to help shrink the ungoverned areas of the world and thereby deny extremists and other hostile parties sanctuary. By helping others to police themselves and their regions, we will collectively address threats to the broader international system. We must also address the continuing need to build and support long-term international security. As the 2006 NSS underscores, relations with the most powerful countries of the world are central to our strategy. We seek to pursue U.S.interests within cooperative relationships, not adversarial ones, and have made great progress. For example, our relationship with India has evolved from an uneasy co-existence during the Cold War to a growing partnership today. We wish to use the opportunity of an absence of fundamental conflict between great powers to shape the future, and to prevent the re-emergence of great power rivalry. The United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China, and it encourages China to participate as a responsible stakeholder by taking on a greater share of burden for the stability, resilience, and growth of the international system. However, much uncertainty surrounds the future course China’s leaders will set for their country. Accordingly, the NSS states that "our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities." A critical component of this strategy is the establishment and pursuit of continuous strategic dialogue with China to build understanding, improve communication, and to reduce the risk of miscalculation. China continues to modernize and develop military capabilities primarily focused on a Taiwan Strait conflict, but which could have application in other contingencies. The Department will respond to China’s expanding military power, and to the uncertainties over how it might be used, through shaping and hedging. This approach tailors investment of substantial, but not infinite, resources in ways that favor key enduring U.S. strategic advantages. At the same time, we will continue to improve and refine our capabilities to respond to China if necessary. We will continue to press China to increase transparency in its defense budget expenditures, strategies, plans and intentions. We will work with other elements ofthe U.S. Government to develop a comprehensive strategy to shape China’s choices. In addition, Russia’s retreat from democracy and its increasing economic and political intimidation of its neighbors give cause for concern. We do not expect Russia to revert to outright global military confrontation, but the risk of miscalculation or conflict arising out of economic coercion has increased. We also share interests with Russia, and can collaborate with it in a variety ofways. We have multiple opportunities and venues to mold our security relationship and to cooperate – such as in countering WMD proliferation and extremist groups. At the same time, we will seek other ways to encourage Russia to act as a constructive partner, while expressing our concerns over policies and aspects of its international behavior such as the sale of disruptive weapons technologies and interference in and coercion of its neighbors. Both China and Russia are important partners for the future and we seek to build collaborative and cooperative relationships with them. We will develop strategies across agencies, and internationally, to provide incentives for constructive behavior while also dissuading them from destabilizing actions. 47d32b03-145e-456e-bf7e-8575819a4fed 47b6c3bf-e543-43fc-bdb3-0a8a4689cce5 1fdb87fc-fe7e-4ef0-80a4-de594ebb312f Conflict Deterrence Deter Conflict _870c8d2c-ae33-4c4b-95bd-2125363d7264 4 Deterrence is key to preventing conflict and enhancing security. It requires influencing the political and military choices of an adversary, dissuading it from taking an action by making its leaders understand that either the cost of the action is too great, is of no use, or unnecessary. Deterrence also is based upon credibility: the ability to prevent attack, respond decisively to any attack so as to discourage even contemplating an attack upon us, and strike accurately when necessary. For nearly half a century, the United States approached its security focused on asingle end: deterring the Soviet Union from attacking the United States and our allies in what could have escalated into a global thermonuclear catastrophe. To that purpose we built our deterrent upon a diverse and survivable nuclear force, coupled with a potent conventional capability, designed to counter the military power of one adversary. Likewise, our assumptions and calculations for shaping deterrence were based largely upon our understanding of the dynamics and culture of the Soviet Union alone. All potential conflict was subsumed and influenced by that confrontation and the fear of escalation within it. Even so, there were limits. Military capabilities alone were, and are, no panacea to deter all conflict: despite the enormous strength of both the United States and the Soviet Union, conflicts arose; some were defused, while others spilled over into local wars. In the contemporary strategic environment, the challenge is one of deterring or dissuading a range of potential adversaries from taking a variety of actions against the U.S. and our allies and interests. These adversaries could be states or non-state actors; they could use nuclear, conventional, or unconventional weapons; and they could exploit terrorism, electronic, cyber and other forms of warfare. Economic interdependence and the growth of global communications further complicate thesituation. Not only do they blur the types of threats, they also exacerbate sensitivity to the effects of attacks and in some cases make it more difficult toattribute or trace them. Finally, the number of potential adversaries, the breadth of their capabilities, and the need to design approaches to deterrence for each, create new challenges. We must tailor deterrence to fit particular actors, situations, and forms of warfare. The same developments that add to the complexity of the challenge also offer us a greater variety of capabilities and methods to deter or dissuade adversaries. This diversity of tools, military and non-military, allows us to create more plausible reactions to attacks in the eyes of opponents and a more credible deterrence to them. In addition, changes in capabilities, especially new technologies, permit us to create increasingly credible defenses to convince would-be attackers that their efforts are ultimately futile. Our ability to deter attack credibly also reassures the American people and ourallies of our commitment to defend them. For this reason, deterrence must remain grounded in demonstrated military capabilities that can respond to a broad array of challenges to international security. For example, the United States will maintain its nuclear arsenal as a primary deterrent to nuclear attack, and the New Triad remains a cornerstone of strategic deterrence. We must also continue to field conventional capabilities to augment or even replace nuclear weapons in order to provide our leaders a greater range of credible responses. Missile defenses not only deter an attack, but can defend against such an attack should deterrence fail. Precision-guided munitions allow us great flexibility not only to react to attacks,but also to strike preemptively when necessary to defend ourselves and our allies. Yet we must also recognize that deterrence has its limits, especially where our interests are ill-defined or the targets of our deterrence are difficult to influence. Deterrence may be impossible in cases where the value is not in the destruction of a target, but the attack and the very means of attack, as in terrorism. We must build both our ability to withstand attack – a fundamental and defensive aspect of deterrence – and improve our resiliency beyond an attack. An important change in planning for the myriad of future potential threats must be post-attack recovery and operational capacity. This, too, helps demonstrate that such attacks are futile, as does our ability to respond with strength and effectiveness to attack. For the future, the global scope of problems, and the growing complexity ofdeterrence in new domains of conflict, will require an integrated interagency and international approach if we are to make use of all the tools available to us. We must consider which non-lethal actions constitute an attack on our sovereignty, and which may require the use of force in response. We must understand thepotential for escalation from non-lethal to lethal confrontation, and learn to calculate and manage the associated risks. dd7027e6-889c-4378-8a44-931cd52234ad 7f5e8a2b-d956-4fc1-9d30-4442065e4d39 6b1c382d-1267-4cb6-8f6d-f25a48591643 Wars Win our Nation’s Wars _31cc6895-ccd6-4b7a-9275-ec33106b929b 5 Despite our best efforts at prevention and deterrence, we must be prepared to act together with like minded states against states when they threaten their neighbors, provide safe haven to terrorists, or pursue destabilizing weapons. Although improving the U.S. Armed Forces’ proficiency in irregular warfare is the Defense Department’s top priority, the United States does not have the luxury of preparing exclusively for such challenges. Even though the likelihood of interstate conflict has declined in recent years, we ignore it at our peril. Current circumstances in Southwest Asia and on the Korean Peninsula, for example, demonstrate the continuing possibility of conflict. When called upon, the Department must be positioned to defeat enemies employing a combination of capabilities, conventional and irregular, kinetic and non-kinetic, across the spectrum of conflict. We must maintain the edge in our conventional forces. Rogue states will remain a threat to U.S. regional interests. Iran and North Korea continue to exert coercive pressure in their respective regions, where each seek to challenge or reduce U.S. influence. Responding to and, as necessary, defeating these, and potentially other, rogue states will remain a major challenge. We must maintain the capabilities required to defeat state adversaries, including those armed with nuclear weapons. 8aea5832-00bf-4e00-a996-6e466d111c8d ad99ca36-0c1d-4b2e-bd8b-e60886aecfff 3c190c7a-c030-402c-9d1c-3177f53c3c49 2008-06-01 2010-02-08 http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/2008NationalDefenseStrategy.pdf Arthur Colman (www.drybridge.com) colman@drybridge.com Submit error.